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Abstract: We investigate the role of cosigners as collateral using data from a South
Indian ￿nancial institution. Using an exogenous change in the cosigner requirement, we
establish a negative causal e⁄ect of cosigners on defaults: an increase in the number of
cosigners reduces defaults all else equal. Our results suggest that a one-sixth increase in
the number of cosigners reduces the incidence of a default by 7:5 percent. While most
theories of collateral predict that increased cosigners will reduce defaults, we are ￿rst to
￿nd empirical evidence of this e⁄ect.
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11 Introduction
There is a widespread theoretical presumption that collateral induces borrowers to repay
loans by overcoming information asymmetries or enforcement problems.1 Identifying this
causal link has proved di¢ cult for the following reason. In many situations the lender
has "soft" information about the riskiness of particular borrowers ￿and this information
is not observed by the researcher (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003).
A lender will then ask ex-ante riskier borrowers for more collateral which will lead the
researcher to report a positive correlation between collateral and ex-post defaults. This
positive correlation has been found in a variety of developed and less developed ￿nancial
markets (Berger and Udell, 1990; Carey, Post and Sharpe, 1998; Jimenez, Salas and Saurina
2006; John, Lynch and Puri 2003 and Liberti and Mian, 2008). There is little empirical
evidence for an underlying negative causal link, however. Put di⁄erently, the question
that motivates us ￿does collateral induce repayments ￿has largely been unanswered in the
previous literature.
We investigate a particular form of collateralized lending in which a borrower￿ s repay-
ment is backed by the collateral of one or more cosigners. Such cosigned loans are
ubiquitous.2 We use data on 11;141 loans given by a non-bank ￿nancial institution in
South India with an average default rate of 12:5 percent. The lender asks for anywhere
between zero to six cosigners on each loan (with a mean of 1:2 cosigners per loan). Cosign-
ers pledge their future wages as collateral ￿and fewer cosigners are associated with less
collateral pledged.
We make two contributions in this paper. First, we extend the ￿ndings of the empirical
1This literature includes models in which collateral reduces moral hazard (Chan and Thakor, 1987 and
Boot and Thakor, 1994), enforces contracts (Aghion and Bolton, 1992), and screens risky borrowers (Bester,
1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a and Besanko and Thakor, 1987b). La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) review the broader institutional consequences of such a view.
2Cosigned loans are popular in the United States (Berger and Udell, 1998), in Europe (Pozzolo, 2004)
and in many developing countries. There are also numerous historical accounts of this lending practice
(Baker, 1977; Guinnane, 1994; Newton, 2000; Phillips and Mushinski, 2001).
2literature on traditional collateral cited above to cosigners as collateral. We ￿nd that the
number of cosigners is positively correlated with default rates: an additional cosigner is
associated with an increase in the incidence of default by about one tenth. Secondly, we
investigate the causal e⁄ect of the number of cosigners on default rates. We exploit a
discontinuity in the rules of the lender, which instruct loan o¢ cers to relax the number of
cosigners required for some loans, but not for others. We ￿nd that defaults rise in response
to this relaxation of the cosigner requirement. The e⁄ects are substantial: a relaxation
of the cosigner requirement by one-sixth increases the probability that the borrower will
default by 7:5 percent or more.
We show that additional cosigners do more than simply provide a way to collect funds
after the loan has been defaulted on by the borrower. Put di⁄erently, we reject the null
hypothesis that cosigners serve only as a hedge against default risk in favor of the alternative
that they promote repayment by the borrower. Cosigners may improve repayment by the
borrower herself by solving adverse selection problems (Besanko and Thakor, 1987a) and
moral hazard problems (Banerjee, Besley, Guinnane, 1994) just as traditional collateral
does. Unlike traditional collateral, cosigners may also promote repayment by providing a
borrower with insurance if she experiences a shock (Rai and Sj￿str￿m, 2004). We cannot
distinguish between these three channels with our data.
We also investigate an interesting and counterintuitive alternative in which relaxing
the number of cosigners on a loan may reduce defaults. This "lazy banks hypothesis"
was suggested by Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001). In contrast with the rest of the
literature, banks have an information advantage over borrowers in their model. It is
e¢ cient for banks to screen borrowers ex ante and not to fund low return projects. But if
loans are collateralized, then banks become lazy since screening is costly. Screening and
collateral are substitutes for the bank. So relaxing the collateral requirement will causally
lead (a) to better screening and (b) even to lower defaults. In our context then relaxing
the cosigner requirement should have the same e⁄ects. While we do ￿nd slight evidence
for the former implication, we ￿nd no evidence that fewer cosigners lower default rates.
3Our study is part of a broader literature on ￿nance and economic development. The
lack of collateral ￿and the accompanying ￿nancial constraints on the poor ￿are thought
to be a primary cause of underdevelopment (Banerjee 2003, Townsend 1997). Cosigners
could serve to provide ￿nancial access to borrowers with no traditional collateral of their
own ￿and thus ease these ￿nancial constraints. Cosigned loans are related to group loans
popular in micro￿nance (Bond and Rai, 2008); both types of lending are based on the use
of "social collateral" to promote repayment.
Plan for the Paper
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide background on the non-bank
￿nancial institution in South India and on our dataset. In Section 3 we outline our empirical
strategy. We discuss our results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2 Data and Institutional Background
This study uses data on Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (commonly referred to as
Roscas). Roscas match borrowers and savers but do so quite di⁄erently from banks. They
are common in many parts of the world (Besley et al, 1993). In this section we provide
some background on how the Roscas in our study operate. We pay particular attention to
who holds the default risk and how loans are secured by cosigners. We also describe the
sample of Rosca borrowers that we will use in our subsequent empirical analysis.
Rules
Roscas are ￿nancial institutions in which the accumulated savings are rotated among par-
ticipants. Participants in a Rosca meet at regular intervals, contribute into a "pot" and
rotate the accumulated contributions. So there are always as many Rosca members as
meetings. In random Roscas, the pot is allocated by lottery and in bidding Roscas the pot
is allocated by an auction at each meeting. Our study uses data on the latter.
4More speci￿cally, the bidding Roscas in our sample work as follows. Each month
participants contribute a ￿xed amount to a pot. They then bid to receive the pot in an
oral ascending bid auction where previous winners are not eligible to bid. The highest
bidder receives the pot of money less the winning bid and the winning bid is distributed
among all the members as an interest dividend. The winning bid can be thought of as the
price of capital. Consequently, higher winning bids mean higher interest payments. Over
time, the winning bid falls as the duration for which the loan is taken diminishes. In the
last month, there is no auction as only one Rosca participant is eligible to receive the pot.
We illustrate the rules with a numerical example:
Example (Bidding and Payo⁄s) Consider a 3 person Rosca which meets once a month
and each participant contributes $10: The pot thus equals $30. Suppose the winning
bid is $12 in the ￿rst month. Each participant receives a dividend of $4: The recip-
ient of the ￿rst pot e⁄ectively has a net gain of $12 (i.e. the pot less the bid plus the
dividend less the contribution, 30 ￿ 12 + 4 ￿ 10). Suppose that in the second month,
when there are 2 eligible bidders, the winning bid is $6: And in the ￿nal month,
there is only one eligible bidder and so the winning bid is zero: The net gains and
contributions are depicted as:
Month 1 2 3
Winning bid 12 6 0
First Recipient 12 -8 -10
Second Recipient -6 16 -10
Last Recipient -6 -8 20
The ￿rst recipient is a borrower: he receives $12 and repays $8 and $10 in subsequent
months, which implies a 30% monthly interest rate. The last recipient is a saver:
she saves $6 for 2 months and $8 for a month and receives $20, which implies a 67%
monthly rate. The intermediate recipient is partially a saver and partially a borrower.
In what follows, we shall often refer to the winning bid or the "repayment burden"
5relative to the pot size. The winning bid in the above example in round 1 is $12 or
40 percent of the pot size. The repayment burden is the total owed (i.e. the sum of
contributions less dividends for a Rosca winner). The repayment burden for the round 1
borrower in the above example is $18 or 60 percent of the pot size. The repayment burden
for round 2 winner is $10 or one-third of the pot.
The Sample
The bidding Roscas we study are large scale and organized commercially by a non-bank
￿nancial ￿rm. The data we use is from the internal records of an established Rosca organizer
in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.3 We collected data on the cosigners for all
Roscas started in the year 2001:
Several hundred Roscas of di⁄erent durations and contributions were started in 2001:
Table 1 summarizes the di⁄erent Rosca denominations. The most common Rosca denom-
ination met for 40 months with a Rs. 250 monthly contribution (the total pot is then
Rs. 10;000): There were also Roscas that met for shorter durations (25 or 30 months) or
for longer (50 months) and with higher and lower total pot sizes. These di⁄erent Rosca
denominations serve to match borrowers and savers with di⁄erent investment horizons.
Every Rosca participant (other than the ￿rst and last winner) is both a borrower and a
saver. For instance, the round 22 winner in a 30 month Rosca has been contributing for 21
months, takes a loan, and then repays for the remaining 8 months of the Rosca. In what
follows we shall refer to the observations in our sample as Rosca borrowers for simplicity ￿
by this we mean Rosca winners who have one or more contributions due after winning the
pot ￿and hence are a repayment risk. So the round 22 borrower in a 30 round Rosca will
have a lower repayment burden (sum of contributions due net of dividends from rounds 23
3Bidding Roscas are a signi￿cant source of ￿nance in South India, where they are called chit funds.
Deposits in regulated bidding Roscas were 12:5% of bank credit in the state of Tamil Nadu and 25% of bank
credit in the state of Kerala in the 1990s, and have been growing rapidly (Eeckhout and Munshi, 2004).
There is also a substantial unregulated chit fund sector.
6to 30) than, say, a round 5 borrower.
In these bidding Roscas, participants do not know each other and the ￿rm that organizes
the Roscas takes on the default risk. If a participant fails to make a contribution, the
organizer will contribute funds on his/her behalf. In this way, a round 22 borrower who fails
to contribute in round 23 will not reduce the pot available to the other Rosca participants
in round 23: In exchange the organizer receives a commission of 6 percent of the pot in
each round. The Rosca organizer is also a special Rosca member who receives the entire
￿rst pot (at a zero bid) and makes contributions thereafter.
We construct our sample of Rosca borrowers from the Roscas started in 2001 as follows:
1. We include Rosca winners for the 14 rounds before and after the middle of the Rosca.
This allows us to use all the information for those Roscas that lasted 30 rounds. The
￿rst pot in these Roscas is won by the Rosca organizer clearly has no default risk and
the last recipient (the pure saver) never has to make a repayment ￿so all 28 auction
winners in 30 round Roscas who have some risk of default are included in our sample.
Table 1 shows that 30 round Roscas are very common.
2. About one third of all Rosca participants are institutional investors. These institu-
tional investors never default and are exempt from collateral requirements. For this
reason we have excluded pots won by institutional investors from our sample.
3. We exclude pots won by housewives from our sample because conversations with loan
o¢ cers indicate that they are treated quite di⁄erently from other Rosca participants
(their husbands are partly liable for repayment and so their cosigner requirement is
not comparable to other Rosca borrowers). That said, our results were una⁄ected
when we did include housewives.
Descriptive statistics for the 11;141 non-institutional non-housewife Rosca borrowers in
our sample are in Table 1 and 2. Each observation refers to a pot awarded to an auction
winner. From Table 2; the mean duration is 34 months and the mean monthly contribution
is Rs. 1424:8 (approximately $29:7 using the exchange rate of 48 Indian Ruppees to one
7US dollar). The winning bid is 17 percent of the pot on average in these Roscas. That
represents (roughly) the fraction of the pot that the borrower is willing to forego to other
participants in order to borrow. Notice that the maximum winning bid is 30 percent of the
pot. This is because of a government imposed ceiling on bids that binds in early rounds of
most Roscas (discussed further in Eeckhout and Munshi, 2004 and Klonner and Rai, 2006).
The repayment burden is 42 percent of the pot on average.
Defaults refer to overdues at the maturity of the loan (at the end of the Rosca). The
mean default rate in our sample is 12:5 percent (Table 2). The default rate for each Rosca
borrower is calculated as the amount outstanding at the end of the Rosca as a fraction of
the repayment burden. So for instance, in the three-person example above, if the Rosca
borrower in round 2 failed to make his round 3 repayment, his default rate would be 1: If
the Rosca borrower in round 1 failed to make his round 3 repayment of $10 (but did make
the round 2 repayment of $8), his default rate would be 10
18 or 56 percent.4
Cosigners and Enforcement
As we have mentioned above, the ￿rm that organizes the Roscas takes on the risk of default.
Rather than asking for physical collateral, the organizer requires auction winners to provide
cosigners before releasing the loans. Cosigners are required to be salaried employees with
a minimum monthly income that depends on the Rosca denomination. This is because the
organizer has a legally enforceable claim against their future income as collateral for the
loan. Relatives (even spouses) can act as cosigners on loans.5
Our ￿eld conversations with loan o¢ cers indicate that they use a variety of character-
istics of the borrower to decide on the number of cosigners required. For instance, the
4We are interested in defaults (or missed contributions) for Rosca participants after they have won the
pot. In some cases Rosca participants may drop out before winning the pot because they fail to make
contributions ￿and they are replaced by other participants.
5We did not have access to cosigner salaries ￿a variable which would have given us an indication of the
quality of each cosigner ￿and hence a better measure of the "total" collateral pledged by cosigners. We
return to this issue when we interpret our results in Section 4:
8winning bid is sometimes seen as an indication of the repayment prospects. A Rosca par-
ticipant who has a history of making contributions on time (in the months before he wins
the auction) is looked on favorably. Moreover, the loan o¢ cer may have access to soft
information on the borrower through social networks. The researcher may observe some of
these characteristics (e.g. the winning bids) but not others, such as the history of on-time
contributions and informal unrecorded opinions that the loan o¢ cer has gathered about the
borrower.
While the loan o¢ cer has discretion in deciding on the number of cosigners required
for each loan, the Rosca organizer issues allows for a relaxation of the cosigner requirement
in the middle round. Rosca borrowers are issued a guideline requiring three cosigners for
winners of auctions up to the middle round of a Rosca, but only two cosigners for winners
of later auctions. To illustrate, for Roscas of 40 months duration and a contribution of Rs.
250 per month, the booklet with information for participants states:
"Nature of Security: If prized within 20 installments - 3 guarantors with a net
income of Rs. 3000 per month and if prized after the above said installments 2
guarantors as above must be furnished."
The rationale is that later borrowers have fewer contributions due and hence are lower
risks than earlier borrowers. Loan o¢ cers told us that they view this guideline as a "rule
of thumb" that allows them to relax the cosigner requirement for borrowers in the second
half of the Rosca relative to borrowers in the ￿rst half.
The average number of cosigners attached to a loan in our sample is 1:2 with considerable
variation (Table 2): If the guidelines were followed strictly, then we would expect an average
of 2:5 cosigners per loan. But as we shall demonstrate in Section 3, the guidelines are
followed in spirit but not to the letter; there is indeed a discontinuous relaxation in the
number of cosigners required at the middle round of Roscas. This particular discontinuity
in assigning cosigners to loans is what we shall exploit to identify the causal e⁄ect of cosigners
on defaults.
9The loan o¢ cer may also verify the auction winner￿ s income before releasing the loan.
For instance, a self-employed person will be asked for tax returns or bank statements while
a salaried employee will be asked for an earning record. This veri￿cation occurs in only
half the cases (see Table 2): Veri￿cation is a form of costly screening on the part of the
loan o¢ cer ￿because it takes time and e⁄ort. If a borrower￿ s income veri￿cation process
yields additional information that suggests he may be a repayment risk, the loan o¢ cer may
ask for additional cosigners. In the data we only observe the eventual number of cosigners
that was required ￿ we do not observe if there was an upward revision in the cosigner
requirement. If the winner of the pot is unable to provide su¢ cient cosigners, then the pot
is re-auctioned at a subsequent Rosca meeting. These re-auctions happen infrequently and
are not recorded explicitly as re-auctions in the dataset. In e⁄ect, loan o¢ cers can push a
person who has won the won the pot but is of dubious repayment quality to later rounds
by such screening. The implications of costly screening will be discussed further in Section
4 when we discuss the "lazy banks" hypothesis.
The defaults we measure re￿ ect payments made by the borrower to the Rosca organizer ￿
and some of these may indeed be ￿nancial help that the borrower has received from cosigners
￿but not payments collected directly from the cosigners by the organizer. To understand
why this is so, it is useful to describe the long and costly collection process.6 When a
borrower misses an installment, then the organizer sends a legal notice to the borrower
(after 5 months), another legal notice to borrower and cosigners (after 6 months) and takes
them to court (at 12 months if the amount is still overdue). The court begins to collect
money from the cosigners approximately 27 months after the missed installment, and remits
collection proceeds to the Rosca organizer around 4 years after the missed installment. The
court also collects a 12 percent per year interest penalty on overdues. Our ￿eld interviews
indicate that the Rosca organizer pushes through with this long costly collection process to
make its collateral threat credible.
6Visaria (2006) ￿nds that legal reforms that improve loan collection in India have substantial e⁄ects on
repayment and interest rates.
10Loan o¢ cers con￿rmed that they never collect money directly from cosigners through
the long legal process, but only receive funds collected from cosigners through the court
at the very end of the 4 year process. Our measure of default is based on overdues at
the end of a Rosca. As our sample comprises only 28 rounds around the middle round
of each Rosca and the longest Rosca duration is 50 months, the longest possible period
that a borrower may have overdues is 39 months (50=2 + 14). We are thus assured that
our default measure is based only on repayment by the borrower herself, not on money
collected from the cosigner approximately 4 years after a missed installment. This feature
will allow us to distinguish whether cosigners promote repayment or are simply an ex-post
hedging device. Since we do not have any data on the money collected through court
proceeding from cosigners, we are unable to quantify the degree to which wages garnished
from cosigners can reduce the 12:5 percent default rate for our sample. Put di⁄erently, we
cannot test the extent to which cosigners serve as a hedge for the lender against default
risk.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is based on a rule of thumb that allows loan o¢ cers to relax the
cosigner requirement for borrowers in the middle of a Rosca. The identifying assumption
is that loan terms such as winning bids and repayment burdens change continuously from
round to round but the cosigner requirement changes discontinuously.
To illustrate, consider a 30 round Rosca in which the loan o¢ cer is allowed to ask for
fewer cosigners in round 16 relative to round 15: Our empirical approach will be to compare
the default rates for round 16 borrowers with those of round 15 borrowers holding other
loan terms constant. In other words, our test is whether round 16 loans are more likely
to default compared with observationally identical round 15 loans. Our null hypothesis
is that cosigners do not induce repayment and so round 16 borrowers are just as likely to
default as round 15 borrowers - holding other loan terms constant.
In this section, we ￿rst show that there is indeed a discontinuity in the number of
11cosigners required in the middle round of Roscas. We then discuss how we shall use the
relaxation in the cosigner requirement to test if there is a causal relationship between the
number of cosigners and defaults. In other words, does the decrease in the number of
cosigners induce a drop in the likelihood of repayment?
Discontinuity in Cosigner Requirement
The number of cosigners required on a loan depends on the loan o¢ cer￿ s discretion and on
the rule of thumb loosening the cosigner requirement after the middle round. We test if
this rule of thumb does indeed explain loan o¢ cer behavior in Table 4 (and Figure 1): Is
there is a decrease in the cosigner requirement in the middle round holding other loan terms
constant?
We ￿rst estimate the following OLS regression for the determinants of the number of
cosigners:
zit = ￿t + ￿xit + "it (1)
where zit is the number of cosigners attached to the loan of the borrower in round t of Rosca
i and xit is a vector of controls. The vector of controls includes dummies for 18 branches and
18 denominations (listed in Table 1) and the 10 borrower employment category dummies
(listed in Table 3): The point estimates of the intercept ￿t are plotted in Figure 1; for space
considerations they are not reported in a table. The round of a borrower is normalized
around the median round in each Rosca.7 OLS estimates of the coe¢ cients in (1) when
relative winning bids and relative repayment burdens are included as controls are shown in
Table 4 column 1: The downward trend in the estimated intercept terms ￿t suggests that
loan o¢ cers relax the cosigner requirement not only at the median round but also gradually
from round to round.
We next explore the downward trend suggested by Figure 1 and investigate if there is
a trend break in the median round. To do so, we regress the number of cosigners required
7If T is the number of Rosca members/rounds, we de￿ne the median round as T=2 if T is even and as
one plus the integer of T=2 if T is odd.
12against a time trend and the lateit indicator:
zit = ￿0 + ￿1t + ￿2t2 + ￿ lateit + ￿xit + "it:
where lateit equals one for all borrowers later than the median round and zero otherwise.
This speci￿cation is based on the identifying assumption that loan terms change continu-
ously from round to round but the cosigner requirement changes discontinuously.
The results of this estimation are in Table 4 column 2 (without winning bid and repay-
ment burden as controls) and in column 3 (with all controls). The quadratic trend line
with the intercept change after the median borrower from column 2 of Table 4 is depicted
in Figure 1. The trend line is downward sloping as fewer cosigners are required for later
borrowers whose repayment burdens are smaller. The estimate of ￿ (the coe¢ cient on
lateit) is positive and signi￿cant indicating a trend break. This trend break can be seen
in Figure 1 : borrowers just after the median round have signi￿cantly fewer cosigners than
those at the median round, controlling for the downward trend. The relaxation in cosigner
requirement is large ￿the number of cosigners required fell by 0:22 cosigners, around 18
percent of the sample mean number of cosigners. The quadratic trend term is insigni￿cant
in column 3 indicating the linear trend ￿ts the default generating process over rounds well
but the ￿t is not as good when the winning bid and repayment burden are excluded from
the list of controls (column 2):
Note that the winning bid is an important determinant of the number of cosigners in
Table 4. When the winning bid increases by 10 percentage points, the loan o¢ cer asks
for nearly 0:3 additional cosigners. The positive relation between higher winning bids and
cosigners required holds conditional on the round (column 1) as well as in the speci￿cation
with a time trend and break (column 3). This accords well with our ￿eld research in which
loan o¢ cers told us that many factors (including the winning bid ￿and potentially factors
correlated with the winning bid) help determine their decision on how many cosigners to
ask for.
13Identifying the Causal Effect of Cosigners on Defaults
Our aim in this paper is to test if the loosening in the cosigner requirement in the median
round (established above) causes an increase in defaults. In this section we ￿rst discuss
how the correlation between cosigners and defaults may obscure this causal link. We then
describe how the discontinuity in the cosigner requirement will help isolate the causal e⁄ect
of cosigners on defaults but not the channel through which this causal e⁄ect operates.
We shall ￿rst estimate the correlation between cosigners and defaults through a Tobit
regression of default rates on trend terms and the number of cosigners:
yit = ￿0 + ￿1t + ￿2t2 + ￿zit + ￿xit + "it; (2)
where yit is the default rate in Rosca i in round t, zit are the number of cosigners attached
to the loan, xit are controls and "it is an error term. A tobit speci￿cation is required as the
default rate is censored at 0 and 1: The estimate of ￿ gives the conditional (on observable
loan characteristics) correlation between cosigners and defaults.
As we have discussed before the correlation coe¢ cient ￿ con￿ ates both the causal link
between cosigners and defaults ￿and the unobserved (by the researcher) characteristics of
borrowers on which loan o¢ cers base the cosigner requirement. In other words, even if an
increase in cosigners causes a drop in defaults, we might very well estimate ￿ > 0 because
inherently risky borrowers are more likely to default ￿and this inherent riskiness is buried
in the error term "it:
To identify the causal e⁄ect of the number of cosigners on defaults, then, we regress
default rates on trend terms and the lateit indicator :
yit = ￿0 + ￿1t + ￿2t2 + ￿ lateit + ￿xit + "it; (3)
where the coe¢ cient ￿ is the causal e⁄ect of the cosigner requirement relaxation in the
middle round on defaults.
We should note one important issue of interpretation at the outset. Even if we ￿nd that
relaxing the cosigner requirement reduces repayment in round 16 relative to round 15; we
14will not be able to distinguish why this might have occurred. In other words, an increase
in defaults could arise if the reduction in cosigners either (a) gave round 16 borrowers
incentives to make riskier project choices or (b) gave riskier types the incentive to wait
to take loans in round 16 rather than round 15 or (c) reduced the insurance provided by
cosigners to borrowers in round 16 relative to round 15. Our null hypothesis is simply that
cosigners are ine⁄ective in simultaneously (a) preventing moral hazard, (b) screening bad
risks, and (c) providing insurance. So if we reject the null, we can conclude that cosigners
are e⁄ective in one or more of these three channels but cannot distinguish which one.
Our empirical strategy may super￿cially resemble the fuzzy regression discontinuity
methods (surveyed by van der Klaauw, 2007) ￿ but there is one important di⁄erence. If
the discontinuity in the number of cosigners was unanticipated, then we would expect no
selection around the middle round. Borrowers who took loans at similar terms just before
and just after the median round would be "as good as randomly assigned." We could then
estimate the treatment e⁄ect of cosigners on repayment (through preventing moral hazard or
providing insurance) by using the lateit dummy as an instrument for the number of cosigners
in regression (2). But in practice the relaxation in the cosigner requirement in the middle
round is public information. We therefore cannot rule out the possibility that riskier types
will delay borrowing till just after the middle round. This form of selection may result
in an upward trend break in defaults ￿and arguably is an e⁄ect of cosigners that we wish
to capture.8 So we do not use the instrumental variable technique (or equivalently fuzzy
regression discontinuity methods) to isolate the treatment e⁄ect of cosigners on defaults.
Instead we shall interpret the coe¢ cient ￿ in regression (3) as the combined treatment and
selection e⁄ect of cosigners on defaults.
Finally, we discuss a problem of inference in our setting, namely that the treatment
assignment depends on the round, a discrete variable. Since the number of cosigners is
lowered in round 16 (compared with round 15) of a 30 round Rosca, it is impossible to
8There is some empirical evidence that riskiness is indeed unobserved by lenders as is assumed in adverse
selection models of credit markets (Klonner and Rai, 2006; Berger et al, 2007):
15compare default rates for borrowers just above and just below the threshold. Lee and
Card (2006) discuss how non-parametric or semi-parametric estimation is impossible in
such a setting. Further, they show how approximating the underlying "true" continuous
process through a lower-order polynomial with discrete support can have speci￿cation errors.
Lee and Card (2006) recommend clustering standard errors by round to account for such
speci￿cation error in inference. This is exactly what we do.9
4 Results
In this section we present our main empirical ￿ndings. First, cosigners and defaults are
positively correlated. Secondly, the causal e⁄ect of additional cosigners on defaults is
negative.
We ￿nd a strong positive relationship between cosigners and default rates, no matter
whether winning bid is included or not, or whether the trend over rounds is parametrized
with separate intercepts for each round or not. These estimates are in Columns 1 through 4
of Table 5. The default rate is regressed against round dummies with and without controls
in columns 1 and 2 and the time intercepts corresponding to column 1 are in Figure 2:
The regression coe¢ cients of default rates on trend terms and the number of cosigners in
speci￿cation (2) are reported in columns 3 and 4: According to the point estimates of ￿,
an additional cosigner is associated with a 5:1 to 5:6 percent increase in default rates.
In contrast to the positive correlation, we ￿nd that cosigners have a negative causal e⁄ect
on defaults in columns 5 and 6: In these speci￿cations, based on (3), we allow for a trend
break in the median round corresponding to the discontinuous rule of thumb documented in
in Section 3: The coe¢ cient on lateit is positive and signi￿cant indicating an upward trend
break in defaults as a consequence of the cosigner relaxation. The trend line from column
5 is shown in Figure 2 which illustrates the upward trend break. The linear trend model
appears to capture the trend in the data satisfactorily. The point estimate for lateit implies
9Accordingly, the standard errors are also clustered by round in Table 4 where we report on the discon-
tinuity in cosigners.
16that the probability of a default, which is 56% in this sample, increases by 4:3 percentage
points at the median round (column 5) and 6:8 percentage points (column 6).
Putting together our ￿ndings from Tables 4 and 5; then, an 18 percent fall in the
number of cosigners leads to a 4:3 to 6:8 percentage point increase in default rates at the
middle round (about a ten to ￿fteen percent increase in defaults). In other words, we
reject the null hypothesis that cosigners simply provide a hedging role but do not provide
any repayment inducement. As we discussed in Section 3, we cannot identify the precise
mechanism through which fewer cosigners increase defaults. The default increase could
be because fewer cosigners induced Rosca borrowers after the middle round to take riskier
projects than those before (moral hazard), pushed riskier types to just after the middle round
(adverse selection) or reduced the insurance provided by cosigners to Rosca borrowers after
the middle round.
The rule of thumb that guides loan o¢ cers allows for a cosigner relaxation in the middle
round but does not specify a cosigner relaxation in other rounds. As a robustness check,
we tested for a relaxation 5 rounds before and 5 rounds after the median round ￿and found
no trend break in the cosigners required in those rounds. Reassuringly, there was no trend
break in default rates either both 5 round before and 5 rounds after the median round.
This form of a "placebo" check lends credence to our estimation strategy that is based
on the median round discontinuity. (Note that testing for a discontinuity in the cosigner
requirement closer to the middle round is likely to pick up the middle round trend break
given that there are just 28 time intercepts for such an estimation).
One way in which loan o¢ cers may respond to the relaxation allowed in the number
of cosigners in the middle round of Roscas is by asking for each of the fewer cosigners to
pledge more salary as collateral. As we mentioned in Section 2, the salary information on
cosigners was not available from the Rosca organizer ￿and so we have no way of directly
testing whether there was such a substitution (from quantity to quality of cosigners). That
said, asking for more salary per cosigner after the middle round would bias our estimates
of the causal e⁄ect ￿ in (3) downwards. So if anything, our estimated causal e⁄ects are
17lower bounds.
Finally, we provide some additional empirical investigation of the lazy-banks hypothesis
(Manove et al, 2001). Recall that the hypothesis would predict increased screening after
the middle round as a consequence of the cosigner relaxation. In other words, the loan
o¢ cers may respond to the drop in collateral (cosigners) by increasing their screening e⁄ort
￿and if the latter e⁄ect is strong enough, this would lead to safer borrowers being funded
just after the middle round ￿and a drop in defaults. A good measure of costly screening
activity by the lender in our context is the income veri￿cation of the borrower. This is
a time-consuming process and involves substantial paperwork. In Table 6 we show that
there is a slight upward trend break in income veri￿cation around the median round. The
quadratic polynomial approximation is not very good, however. This slight upward trend
break is also shown in Figure 3: So even though the loan o¢ cer may be spending more time
screening in response to the relaxation in cosigner requirement, the increase in screening
is relatively small and does not prevent defaults from rising in the middle round (Table 5;
columns 5 and 6): So while screening and collateral might indeed be slight substitutes, we
do not ￿nd empirical support for the lazy-banks hypothesis in our context.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the use of cosigners as collateral using data from South India.
We show that the number of cosigners is positively correlated with defaults ￿presumably
because borrowers who are high default risk are asked for more cosigners. This is very
similar to the positive correlation ￿nding in the empirical collateral literature. We go
further to investigate whether there is a causal link between the number of cosigners required
on a loan and the subsequent default probability. We use an exogenous relaxation in the
number of cosigners required to isolate this causal e⁄ect.
To summarize, our ￿ndings are broadly consistent with models in which ex-ante riskier
borrowers are asked for more cosigners and cosigners reduce defaults ex-post. One such
model that has both the positive correlation and the negative causation between collateral
18and defaults is by Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991). In their model the collateral is provided
by borrowers ￿but the same results would apply if collateral were provided by cosigners
instead. Borrowers di⁄er in terms of observed riskiness and are subject to moral hazard.
Lenders ask observably riskier borrowers for more collateral (positive correlation) ￿ yet
collateral also has an incentive e⁄ect (negative causal e⁄ect). Simpler models which just
have a positive correlation between cosigners and defaults but no causal link ￿or a negative
causal link but no correlation ￿are not consistent with what we ￿nd. A model in which
cosigners merely hedge against ex-post risk is inconsistent with our ￿ndings. So too is a
model based on Manove et al (2001) in which an increase in collateral provided by cosigners
causes an increase in defaults.
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 Table 1. Rosca Denominations. 
Duration 





25 400  10,000  141 1,016
25 1,000  25,000  48 911
25 2,000  50,000  42 933
25 4,000  100,000  18 422
30 500  15,000  71 1,306
30 1,000  30,000  19 451
30 2,500  75,000  11 238
30 3,000  90,000  5 105
30 5,000  150,000  16 443
30 10,000  300,000  5 140
40 250  10,000  310 1,707
40 500  20,000  12 182
40 625  25,000  39 929
40 1,250  50,000  37 857
40 2,500  100,000  33 1,020
40 5,000  200,000  1 17
50 1,000  50,000  20 359
50 2,000  100,000  3 105
 
Notes: “Number of Roscas” is the number of distinct Roscas started in 2001 in the sample.   
“Number of Observations” is the observations from a particular denomination that are used in the subsequent analysis.  Each 
observation refers to a Rosca winner.  This column sums to 11,141 which is our sample size.  Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Rosca Value (Pot), Rs.  45,892.7 47,381.8 10,000 300,000
Contribution per Month, Rs.  1,424.8 1,546.9 250 10,000
Rosca Duration  33.59 7.31 25 50
Number of Cosigners  1.221 1.174 0 6
Late Round (Incidence)  0.570 0.495 0 1
Round 1.771 7.891 -13 14
Default Rate  0.125 0.183 0 1
Winning Bid Relative to Pot  0.175 0.098 0.050 0.300
Repayment Burden Relative to Pot  0.418 0.208 0.064 0.862
Borrower Income Verified by Lender 0.507 0.500 0 1
    
Notes: 11141 observations from Roscas started in the year 2001 in 18 branches and 18 Rosca denominations. Institutional borrowers 
and housewives are excluded from the sample. Repayment Burden is the sum of net contributions (required contributions less 
dividends) due from a Rosca winner in round t in rounds t+1, t+2...T, where T is the last month of the Rosca. Default rate refers to 
amount outstanding at the termination of the Rosca relative to the repayment burden. Table 3. Occupational Characteristics of Borrowers. 
Borrower Occupation  Frequency Relative Frequency (%)
Services 597 5.36
Education 712 6.39







Not Verified  6,029 54.12
 Table 4. OLS Analysis of the Number of Cosigners. 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable: Number of Cosigners     
      
Late Round (Dummy)    -0.2209***  -0.0805* 
   (0.0441)  (0.0416) 
      
Round   -0.0690***  -0.0455***
   (0.0029)  (0.0074) 
      
Round Squared    -0.0006**  0.0002 
   (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
      
Winning Bid  2.9673***    2.9251***
 (0.2555)    (0.2501) 
      
Repayment Burden  -0.0541    0.0823 
 (0.3329)    (0.2890) 
      
Round Dummies  Yes  No  No 
Observations 11141  11141  11141 
Estimation Method  OLS  OLS  OLS 
R-squared 0.46  0.44  0.46 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by round. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
All specifications include dummy variables for branch locations (18), Rosca denomination (18) 
and profession of the borrower (10). In addition, specification 1 includes 28 dummies for each 
round.  Winning bid and repayment burden are measured relative to pot. Table 5. Tobit Estimation of the Default Rate. 
     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
Dependent Variable: Default Rate           
            
Number of Cosigners  0.0368***  0.0346***  0.0359***  0.0344***     
 (0.0035)  (0.0034)  (0.0034)  (0.0033)     
            
Late Round (Dummy)          0.0284*  0.0465** 
         (0.0145)  (0.0191) 
            
Round     -0.0035***  -0.0006  -0.0080***  -0.0037 
     (0.0007)  (0.0043)  (0.0010)  (0.0043) 
            
Round Squared      -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0000 
     (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
            
Winning Bid    0.3219***    0.1757**    0.3317*** 
   (0.0655)    (0.0734)    (0.0707) 
            
Repayment Burden    0.1418    0.0473    0.0794 
   (0.2124)    (0.1988)    (0.2065) 
            
Round Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Observations 11,141  11,141  11,141 11,141 11,141 11,141 
Estimation Method  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit  Tobit 
Log-Likelihood -3,625.6  -3,607.5  -3,664.31 -3,658.9  -3,733.0  -3,715.2 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by round. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
There are 4,406 (default-rate of zero) left and 51 right-censored (default-rate of one) observations. 
All specifications include dummy variables for branch location (18), Rosca denomination (18) and profession of the borrower (11). 
In addition, specifications 1 and 2 include dummies for each round (28). Winning bid and repayment burden are measured relative to pot. Table 6. Probit Estimation of Income Verification. 
     (1)    (2) 
Dependent Variable: Income Verified by Lender (Dummy)   
    
Late Round (Dummy)  0.0230  0.0973* 
 (0.0439)  (0.0497) 
    
Round -0.0130***  0.0262* 
 (0.0037)  (0.0138) 
    
Round Squared  -0.0019***  -0.0016*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
    
Winning Bid    0.3846 
   (0.3595) 
    
Repayment Burden    1.5620*** 
   (0.5734) 
    
Observations 11,141  11,141 
Estimation Method  Probit  Probit 
Log-Likelihood -4610.8  -4,596.3 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by round. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
All specifications include dummy variables for branch location (18), Rosca denomination (18) and profession of the borrower (11). 
Winning bid and repayment burden are measured relative to pot. 
  
 